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I. INTRODUCTION

One can only marvel at the success of the New York Convention' over its
fifty-year span, and as Gary Born wrote in the second edition of his
InternationalCommercialArbitration: Commentary and Materials, quoting
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judge Stephen Schwebel, "It works." 2
Even though one can identify particular flaws, the Convention has proved a
success in providing a basic framework that has ensured the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and arbitration awards for the international commercial
community.
One important feature of a successful international convention is the
autonomous and uniform interpretation of the convention by national courts.3
With respect to the New York Convention, there are indications that an
international standard has emerged at numerous points. Article 11(3), providing
for exceptions to the enforcement of arbitration agreements, is generally
understood to refer only to traditional contract defenses and not to broader
public policy concerns. Also, with respect to Article V's "procedural defenses"
to enforcement of awards (such as lack of notice or the ability to present one's
case), a truly anational standard has emerged in interpreting those defenses.
Still, the role for national law has been left relatively open in the structure of
the New York Convention (the Convention), and, not surprisingly, has
contributed to the failure in reaching a truly international standard for
international commercial arbitration. Interestingly, with respect to the
substantive defenses to enforcement, where national law is given a prominent
role, such as arbitrability (Article V(2)(a)) and public policy (Article V(2)(b)),
national courts have not been parochial in using national law applicable under
these Articles, and national courts have acknowledged the need to take account

' Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND

MATERIALS 21 (2d ed. 2001); see also Stephen M. Schwebel, A Celebrationof the United
Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 12 ARB. INT'L 83, 85 (1996).
' I have previously written about this issue in the very different context of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See Linda Silberman,
Interpretingthe Hague Abduction Convention: In Search ofa GlobalJurisprudence, 38 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 1049 (2005). For a more general discussion of the need for uniform
interpretation of multilateral treaties, see Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretationof International
Agreements by Domestic Courtsand the Politicsof InternationalTreaty Relations:Reflections
on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 559 (1996).
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of international and not merely domestic norms. Accordingly, these Convention
exceptions for national law have not created great disharmony where one might
have thought they would.
However, there are other areas involving arbitration agreements and awards
where national law plays a predominant role and has given rise, and will
continue to give rise, to an increase in litigation with respect to both arbitration
agreements and awards. This Article discusses three such areas: (1) Convention
country treatment of awards that have been set aside by the arbitral seat; (2)
procedural requirements imposed by national law for enforcement of arbitral
awards; and (3) the appropriate choice of law rule for determining whether an
agreement is null and void under Article I of the Convention.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SET-ASIDES AND ARTICLE V(1)(e) OF THE
CONVENTION

While the Convention offers standards for recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award in the courts of another country,4 it says nothing about the
grounds for review or set-aside at the place of arbitration. Thus, each country
is free to superintend an arbitration that takes place in its territory and an
arbitration award that is rendered in that country. The Convention, pursuant
to Article V(1)(e), allows the non-recognition or non-enforcement of an award
that has been set aside "by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, the award was made."5 But there is no obligation to
refuse enforcement of the award, which means that a country is nonetheless
free to enforce an arbitration award set aside in the country where the award
was rendered.6 There may be some good reasons for such a system. On the
one hand, some check on the arbitral process in the place of arbitration is
desirable. At the same time, there is a danger of local favoritism and
parochialism that might lead the country where the arbitration takes place to set
4 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V.
The language of Article V(l) of the Convention (in English) is "Recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused." The italicized language in the French text is ne
seront refuses ...que s"'- which has a mandatory quality.
6 Note that the permissive language is used for all grounds set forth in Article V, and thus
it appears that a judge has discretion to recognize or enforce an award even when one of the
grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement is satisfied. But it is generally thought that,
unless there has been a waiver, a judge would abuse that discretion if the judge recognized or
enforced an award when a ground for refusing recognition or enforcement is found to exist, other
than in the case where the ground for refusal depends upon the decision of a foreign judge, i.e.,
Article V(1)(e). See JEAN-FRANCOIs POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 829 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007).
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aside an award on grounds that are peculiarly idiosyncratic to that country. To
mediate this balance, the Convention appears to leave discretion to the country
where the award is sought to be enforced, but provides no guidance as to when
enforcement is appropriate.7
Two limitations of the Convention are now apparent. First, it does not
provide any kind of uniformity for when an award may be set aside. Second,
it offers no guidelines as to when an award that has been set aside should
nonetheless be enforced. Because that determination is left to national law,
there is a possibility that an award which is set aside is still enforceable
somewhere! One example of the latter trend is in France. Because national
law in France eliminates Article V(1)(e) from its international arbitration law, 9
an award set aside elsewhere will always be enforceable in France, provided
there is no other basis for non-recognition under the Convention. In two
French decisions, HilmartonLtd. v. Omnium de Traitementet de Valorisation °
and PT PutrabaliAdyamulia v. Rena Holding, Ltd," the Cour de Cassation
enforced the awards that had been set aside at the place of arbitration and gave
' For a discussion of how annulled awards have been treated in various countries, see Dana
Freyer, The Enforcement of Awards Affected by Judicial Orders of Annulment at the Placeof

Arbitration, in ENFORCEMENT

OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL

AwARDs: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION INPRACTICE 757 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico di
Pietro eds., 2008).
8 More generally, the Convention is structured to permit enforcement of awards in one
country and not in another, even if that is not a desired outcome. However, the set-aside
presents a more difficult dilemma because the aftermath of a set-aside is often a second award.
Thus, there is the possibility of enforcement of conflicting awards. See infra text accompanying
notes 13-20.
9 Article 1502 of the Code de ProcedureCivile lists the exclusive grounds on which an
international award may be refused recognition or enforcement in France; Article 1502 does not
contain any reference to an annulment in the country of origin. CODE DE PROCtDURE C1VfLE
[C.P.C.] art. 1502 (Fr.), available at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_39.pdf. Thus Article
V(1)(e) is not part of French law, and apparently is not required by the Convention because
Article VII provides that the Convention shall not deprive a party of more favorable rights of
recognition and enforcement under the law of the country where the award is sought to be relied
upon. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII. An explanation of the reasoning
behind Article 1502 of the Code de ProcedureCivile is provided in Richard W. Hulbert, When
the Theory Doesn 't Fit the Facts:A FurtherComment on Putrabali, 25 ARB. INT'L 157, 158-59
(2009).
0 Cour de Cassation [Cass. le civ.] Mar. 23, 1994, note Jarrosson (Fr.), reprintedin 1994
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 327 (1994).
" Cour de Cassation [Cass. le civ.] June 29, 2007, note Gaillard (Fr.), reprintedin 2007
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 507 (2007). An English translation of excerpts of the decision by
Richard Hulbert can be found in Linda Silberman & Richard Hulbert, International Commercial
Arbitration, Additional Cases and Materials 223-28 (Spring 2009) (unpublished teaching
materials, on file with the author) [hereinafter Putrabaliin Additional Cases and Materials].
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no weight to the set asides. The Court explained that the recognition of an
annulled award "does no more than consecrate the nature of the international
arbitrator, the true international jurisdiction for this type of controversy, who
cannot acknowledge another judge."' 2 The French perspective considers an
arbitral award as unattached to any national legal order or any forum and
having no nationality, but as one capable of being accepted and enforced
throughout the world.
The French approach creates significant complications, particularly in cases
where a second award is made after the annulment. Not only are other
countries likely to respect the annulment, but they will also enforce the later
award. The result is inconsistency and unpredictability. For example, in the
Hilmartoncase, where there was a subsequent second award (inconsistent with
the first) rendered in Switzerland after the initial award had been set aside by
a Swiss court, an English court enforced the second award 3 even though a
French court had already enforced the first award 4 and had refused to enforce
the second. 5 Certainly international arbitration ought to do better than this.
The Putrabali arbitration fared no better. 16 An award rendered in an
English arbitration between a French buyer and an Indonesian seller resulted
in an award in favor of the French party that was annulled in part by an English
court on the basis of an error of law (review of such questions not having been
excluded under the English Arbitration Act).' 7 There was then a second award
in favor of the Indonesian party. The French party sought enforcement of the
initial award in its favor in France, and the Indonesian party sought
enforcement of the lateraward in its favor in France. The French courts, all the
way to the Cour de Cassation, enforced only the first award and saw the second
as precluded by the first.
The French solution, particularly in a case like Putrabaliwhere there were
two inconsistent awards at the time that enforcement of the earlier award was
sought, is particularly unattractive. As Richard Hulbert emphasizes in his
recent article on Putrabali,the award for which exequatur was sought was

,2See Putrabaliin Additional Cases and Materials, supranote 11, at 227.
,Onnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., [1999] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 222 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
" Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation-OTV, Cour de Cassation [Cass.
I eciv.] Mar. 23, 1994, note Jarrosson (Fr.), reprintedin 1994 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 327 (1994).

"sOmnium de Traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation [Cass. 1e civ.]
June 10, 1997 (Fr.).
16For an excellent and extensive analysis ofthePutrabaliarbitration and judicial decisions,
see Hulbert, supra note 9.
17See Putrabaliin Additional Cases and Materials, supranote 11, at 227.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 38:25

dismissal of the claimant's case.18 The likely strategy by the party seeking
exequatur was a tactical maneuver to prevent subsequent enforcement in
France of the later award, since the first award could have been raised as a
defense if the claimant had brought subsequent litigation in France.
Whatever one may think of the French approach, none of the other
alternatives is perfect. One solution for Contracting States is to take an
approach completely opposite from the French and always refuse to enforce an
award that has been set aside by a court at the arbitral situs. 9 This approach
rests on the parties' choice of a regime of arbitration law: the parties should
have understood the risks of annulment when they chose to arbitrate at a
particular place. If the courts at the situs are known to be interventionist or
protectionist, the parties have only themselves to blame because they assumed
those consequences when they chose to arbitrate there. In the Putrabalicase,20
for example, it might well be argued that because the parties chose English
arbitration law and its attendant consequences, including appeals on issues of
law to the extent that the arbitration agreement does not exclude such review
(as it did not in Putrabali),the parties should have to abide by the arbitration
regime that they have chosen, including substantive review of the law. Thus,
once the English court set aside the award on a ground that has been part of
English arbitration practice for decades and a new award is rendered, it is the
English judgment setting aside the award that should be recognized, and the
initial award should not be enforced anywhere.
But other cases may be more troubling, and the solution of holding the
parties to their chosen "arbitration regime" is not entirely satisfactory. In some
situations, the place of arbitration is chosen largely for convenience of the
parties or as a neutral site, or as the only place where certain parties, such as
governmental entities, will (or can) agree to arbitrate. For example, in the
recent D.C. Circuit decision in the United States, TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v.
Electranta S.p., 21 the only realistic place of arbitration with respect to an
agreement with a Colombian governmental entity was probably Colombia.
The resulting set-aside by the Colombian court appeared to be the result of
local favoritism. Nonetheless, the court in the United States honored the
Hulbert, supranote 9, at 167-68.
Proponents of this view argue that once the award is annulled, it ceases to exist and cannot
be recognized or enforced anywhere. For recent criticism of this position, see Hans Smit,
Annulment andEnforcementoflnternationalArbitralAwards:A PracticalPerspective, 18 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 297, 303-07 (2007).
20 Cour de Cassation [Cass. le civ.] June 29, 2007, note Gaillard (Fr.), reprintedin REVUE
DE L'ARBrrRAGE 507 (2007).
21 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See also infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
IS

19
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annulment and refused to enforce the award-a decision that has been
criticized by various commentators.22
Another approach to Article V(1)(e) is to accept the discretionary text of
Article V(l) as just that, and view the discretion about whether or not to
enforce an award that has been set aside as belonging to the court in the
Contracting State asked to enforce the award. That seems to be the position
taken in the case of Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 3 by
United States District Court Judge Green who observed that "Article V
provides a permissive standard, under which this Court may refuse to enforce
an award., 24 Relying on Article VII of the Convention,2 5 Judge Green found
that national law-in particular, the standards adopted in the Federal
Arbitration Act-justified recognition of the award.26
Alternatively, it might be thought that the discretion in the English text of
Article V in general (including Article V(1)(e)) is better understood as directing
States party to the New York Convention to identify in their own law the
circumstances when a vacated award should be enforced. French law, for
example, does not implement the provisions of Article V(1)(e), and the more
favorable approach to set-asides under French law is authorized by Article VII
of the Convention.27
The uncertainty about enforcement of awards that have been set aside at the
place of arbitration inevitably means litigation at the enforcement stage. And
because there is no uniformity of practice, not only is choice of forum for
enforcement critical, but other tactical maneuvering, as already seen in the
Putrabalicontext, is common-place. Another example of litigation tactics
around arbitration is the use of anti-suit injunctions to prioritize a favorable

22 See, e.g., 2GARYB. BORN, INTERNATIONALCOMMERCIALARBITRATION2685-87

(2009).

23 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
24 Id. at 914.
25 Article VII of the Convention gives an interested party the right to invoke the national law

of the country where the award is sought to be relied upon to uphold an arbitration award. New
York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII.
26 Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 910. However, the majority of courts in the United States
have refused to enforce an award that has been set aside at the arbitral seat. See, e.g., TermoRio
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v.
Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in TermoRio
did not overrule Chromalloy, but distinguished it on various grounds, including the fact that all
the connections in TermoRio were with Colombia (Colombian parties, Colombian seat, and
Colombian law), and that there was no finality clause precluding judicial review as there was
in Chromalloy. TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 937.
27 See Hulbert, supra note 9, at 159.
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forum or to prohibit enforcement in a particular forum. In the KarahaBodas
28
MinyakDan GasBumiNegara(Pertamina)
Co. v. PerusahaanPertambangan
litigation, a court in Indonesia issued a provisional injunction restraining the
winning party, a Cayman Island company, from attempting to enforce its Swiss
arbitral award in the United States. A court in the United States then issued its
own injunction to restrain the Indonesian party from proceeding with its
annulment action.29 In the end, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
U.S. anti-suit injunction was not appropriate since even a successful suit
annulling the award in Indonesia would not prevent a court in the U.S. from
enforcing the award.3" But one should not conclude that anti-foreign-suit
injunctions are always inappropriate in proceedings to enforce an arbitral award.
In subsequent proceedings in Pertamina,a New York federal court involved in
execution proceedings brought against property ofPertamina issued an anti-suit
injunction restraining Pertamina from proceeding with an action in the Cayman
Islands directed against the New York execution proceedings.31 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, modifying the injunction slightly, affirmed the
issuance of the anti-suit injunction in this context, observing that it was not
enjoining Pertamina from defending an enforcement proceeding in another
jurisdiction because the Cayman Islands proceeding was not really an
enforcement proceeding at all.32
In the absence of an amendment to the New York Convention or a Protocol
to deal with the problem of annulled awards, one possible solution is to look
to the law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to provide
guidance. When a court at the arbitral seat sets aside an arbitral award, a
second court asked to recognize and enforce the award has no obligation under
the Convention to do so. However, there is now a judgment from a national
court, and a court that enforces an arbitral award set aside by that national court
is thus refusing to recognize the foreign judgment. National laws on
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments could offer guidance for
when refusal of recognition of such a judgment is appropriate. If the judgment
is one that would be entitled to recognition, the set-aside should be respected
and the award should not be enforced. However, if the judgment is one that
does not meet the criteria for recognition and enforcement under national law,
28 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
29 Id. at
30 Id. at

361-62.
369.
3' Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F.

Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

32 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007).
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such as fairness of process or international public policy (which would
incorporate international standards for respecting arbitral awards), then the setaside judgment should not be respected and the award should be enforced.
A "judgments" solution to the problem of annulled awards has the limitation
that it too lacks uniformity. That is to say, recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is generally governed by national law and not international
standards. Indeed, even though the Member States of the European Union are
obligated to enforce judgments of other Member States pursuant to the EU
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters,33 arbitration is outside of its scope. Thus,
there is no assurance that New York Convention Contracting States would treat
a set-aside judgment in a uniform way, and accordingly, it might be thought
there would be no improvement of the present situation. However, in looking
at transnational recognition and enforcement practices comparatively, one finds
a basic similarity of frameworks in various countries. Most countries accept
a general principle of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments34 and
most agree in a general way on the criteria that give rise to exceptions to that
principle. 35 A "judgments" solution would at least provide identifiable
principles---even if pursuant to national law-to help determine when a setaside should be respected and when it should not.36
A recent decision by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Yukos CapitalSARL
v. OAORosneft,37 reflects how a "recognition of foreign judgments" framework

31 Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
34 Even some notable outliers tojudgment recognition, such as Sweden and the Netherlands,

have carved outjudicial exceptions to non-recognition, and in 2004 Belgium changed its rdvision
aufond procedure so that review on the merits is no longer permitted. Samuel P. Baumgartner,
How Well Do US. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 173, 187-89
(2008).
3' Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgements on Judgments:A View from America, 19 KING'S
L.J. 235, 237-38 (2008).
36 In the United States, recognition and enforcement of judgments is treated as a matter of
state law in most cases, but the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment annulling a
New York Convention award would fit the type of exception where federal law is called for.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt.
a (1987) (stating that recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is typically a matter of
state law unless there is a basis for federal jurisdiction such as a treaty or federal statute). The
principles of recognition and enforcement and the grounds for non-recognition and nonenforcement are found in §§ 481-482 of the Restatement (Third). For a more extensive and
comprehensive treatment ofrecognition and enforcement principles in the United States, see AM.
LAW INST.,

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND

(2006).
" Yukos Capital SARL/OAO Rosneft, Gerechtshof [Hof], Amsterdam, Apr. 28, 2009,

PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE
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can operate to permit enforcement of an award that has been set aside. The
Dutch court granted leave to enforce in the Netherlands four arbitral awards
issued by the International Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC) at the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in arbitral
proceedings brought by Yukos Capital against Yuganskneftegaz to recover on
four loan agreements." The award in favor of Yukos was set aside by the
commercial court in Russia, and that decision was upheld by two appeals courts
in Russia. Among the grounds relied upon for setting aside the award was a
failure to disclose that the managing partner of the law firm representing Yukos
had organized conferences in which the arbitrators had participated. Although
the district court in the Netherlands honored the Russian judgment setting aside
the award and refused to enforce the award, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
took a different view. It looked to rules of private international law with
respect to whether the decisions of the Russian courts should be recognized,
and concluded that a foreign judgment rendered by a judicial body that is not
impartial and independent should not be recognized. The Amsterdam Court of
Appeal then pointed to evidence submitted by Yukos Capital as well as a
substantial body of case law in various European countries that demonstrated
the lack of independence and impartiality of the Russian judiciary with respect
to the Yukos affair. It found an undeniable connection between the present
dispute and the altercations in Russia that led to the dismantling and
bankruptcy of the Yukos Oil Company.39
Acceptance by courts in the United States of a judgments-recognition
principle in dealing with set-asides might have resulted in a different outcome
in the TermoRio case. In TermoRio, the basis of the Colombian court's
decision was that the arbitration agreement selecting the ICC Rules was invalid
under Colombian law.' Such a foreign judgment annulling an arbitration
award on this parochial ground is inconsistent with international arbitration
principles; accordingly, that judgment would be "repugnant to the public policy
of the United States,"'t 1 a basic ground for nonrecognition of a foreign

No. 200.005.269/01 (Neth.); see also Emmanuel Gaillard, Enforcement ofAnnulledAwards: The
Dutch Chapter,N.Y. L.J., June 4, 2009, at 3 col. 1.
38 At the time of the loan "Yukos Capital, a Luxembourg based company, and
Yuganskneftegaz both formed part of the Yukos Group to which Yukos Oil Company also
belonged." Gaillard, supra note 37. Eventually, Yuganskneftegaz became part of Rosneft, a
Russian state-owned oil company. Id.
39Id.
o TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 482(2)(d) (1987).
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country's judgments in both the United States and elsewhere. Of course, the
standard for "public policy" in the context of the New York Convention and
international arbitration should not be one of parochial or national interests, but
of broader international scope.42
Gary Born, in his impressive new treatise on arbitration, suggests that courts
in the United States "will likely disregard foreign annulment decisions relying
on an extensive substantive review of the tribunal's decision" or foreign
annulment decisions that are procedurally tainted or based upon local public
policy.43 Born appears to endorse an approach similar to that in Article IX(l)
of the European (Geneva) Convention,' which does not recognize a set-aside
unless it was based on one of the specific grounds specified in Article IX(1)(a)
to (d) of that Convention.45 But the New York Convention is not so limited.
In particular, under the New York Convention, where the parties have agreed
to arbitration in a place where substantive legal review is part of the arbitral
regime, annulment on that basis would appear to be appropriate. Adopting the
framework of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to evaluate the
set-aside would catch procedurally tainted or parochially based set-asides but
would leave substantive review in place if it were part of the annulment regime
at the situs.4 6 Other countries may find that their own national laws on
recognition and enforcement of judgments will lead to similar results as to
when a set-aside should be respected and when it might be ignored. Thus, the

42 Cf. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier

(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (identifying standard of "public policy" in context
of recognition and enforcement of awards under the New York Convention).
43 2 BORN, supra note 22, at 2687.
4 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. IX(l), openedfor
signatureApr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, 374-76.
45 Jan Paulsson offers a similar proposal, arguing that a local annulment ought not to prevent
international recognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award unless the grounds
for the annulment were those identified by the Convention itself. See Jan Paulsson, Enforcing
ArbitralAwards Notwithstandinga Local StandardAnnulment (LSA), 9 ICC INT'L CT. ARB.
BULL. 14 (1998).

4 Interestingly, the initial approach of the Reporters for the newly initiated American Law
Institute Project on international commercial arbitration is along the same lines. See
RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION § 13(c) (Council Draft No. 1, Oct. 14, 2009). It provides:
Although a Convention award has been set aside by a competent foreign

authority, a court of the United States may recognize or enforce the award if
the judgment setting aside the award is not entitled to recognition under the
principles governing the recognition of foreign judgments in the court where
recognition or enforcement of the award is sought, or in other extraordinary
circumstances.
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use of the "recognition of judgments" framework would provide some
guidance for set-asides under the New York Convention, other than the
European Convention solution, which it chose not to adopt.
Interestingly, the issue of the relationship between awards and judgments
may arise in a second way in the Yukos case. Yukos Capital is now seeking to
enforce that arbitral award (and/or the Dutch judgment) in a New York court.47
Thus, there are now two "judgments" as well as one award for the New York
court to consider. Under the approach I have proposed, the New York court
should consider whether the Russian set-aside judgment is to be respected as
a matter of U.S. judgments-recognition law. Using those principles, it might
reach the same conclusion that the Dutch court did-that there was not an
impartial system of tribunals operating in Russia. But how should the court in
the United States treat the Dutch judgment itself?. If a judgment-recognition
framework is accepted, does that mean that the Dutch judgment, as the
judgment later in time, should itself be recognized?
The answer is no, for two reasons. The first is that the judgment relating to
recognition or enforcement-like an exequatur on a judgment--does not
necessarily have territorial scope and thus need not be "recognized.""8 Second,
even applying the principles of U.S. judgments-recognition law, a foreign
judgment need not be recognized if it conflicts with another final and
conclusive judgment. 49 Thus, it is for the court in the United States to draw an
independent conclusion about whether to respect the Russian set-aside
judgment.

47 Uzma Balkiss Sulaiman, Yokos Dispute Continues in New York, GLOBAL ARB. REv.,
Sept. 23, 2009.
41 There are numerous questions to consider about the relationship between awards and

judgments, but for the purposes of this Article, I have offered the limited solution of using a
judgments framework to decide whether or not a second country should give effect to a
judgment of set-aside rendered at the seat of arbitration. It might well be that a similar approach
should be adopted to deal with a judgment confirming an award at the seat, particularly where
arguments to set aside the award are made and rejected, and where a subsequent challenge to
recognition and enforcement in another country raises the same grounds. On the other hand, an
exequatur or ajudgment relating to recognition or enforcement may have only territorial scope
and thus need not be "recognized" in another country. Further analysis of these questions will
follow in future work.
" Cf Byblos Bank Europe, S.A. v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 40 A.D.3d 497, 837
N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007), af'd, 885 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 2008) (refusing to enforce
judgment of Belgian court, which had failed to recognize prior Turkish judgment because at the
time Belgium had a rivision au fond procedure and itself had departed from res judicata
principles).
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III. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS:
JURISDICTION AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS

A second recent issue that has created litigation around arbitration pertains
to the procedural rules about the appropriate forum for enforcement of an
arbitral award. This issue may not be as widespread or as "international" a
problem as the set-aside issue, but it is potentially as important. Article III of
the New York Convention allows the country of enforcement to establish rules
of procedure for recognition and enforcement of Convention awards. The only
limitation is that those conditions be substantially the same as for domestic
awards. ° Thus, it would seem quite appropriate that countries require a basis
of jurisdiction over the defendant where recognition or enforcement is being
sought.
The International Commercial Disputes Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York looked at this question with respect to the law in
the United States on this issue as well as the requirements imposed by other
countries. 5 Interestingly, it appears that in some countries there may be no
requirement of a jurisdictional nexus in order to enforce a foreign arbitral
award.52 This may seem strange to a U.S. trained lawyer, but it is possible to
understand the lack of any requirement as based on the consent to arbitrate
itself. In other words, it could be argued that an agreement to arbitrate in a
country that is a signatory to the Convention is tantamount to a consent 5to3
jurisdiction to enforce that award in the courts of any other signatory country.
However, such an argument was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals for

0 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. III.
Int'l Commercial Disputes Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Lack of
Jurisdictionand Forum Non Conveniens as Defenses to the Enforcement of ForeignArbitral
Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 407 (2004) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar Committee Report].
(The author was a member of that Committee as well as the Subcommittee that wrote the
Report.)
52 See id. at 413-14 n.26. According to the N.Y. City Bar Committee Report, France,
Germany, Italy, and Sweden appear to provide a forum for enforcement even when there is no
connection between the debtor or his property and a particular place within the country. Id.; see
also Rosseel N.V. v. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. (U.K.) Ltd., [1991] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 625 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (indicating that the presence of assets in the jurisdiction is not a
precondition for the enforcement of a New York Convention award). The N.Y. City Bar
Committee Report, which did not cite Rosseel, indicated that English law did require at least the
presence of property. N.Y. City Bar Committee Report, supranote 51, at 414-15.
" See William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law:
Emerging Conflicts in InternationalArbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 285-87 (2006).
51
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the D.C. Circuit in CreightonLtd. v. Qatar,54 in which the court held that Qatar
did not waive its objection to personal jurisdiction over an enforcement action
against it in the United States when it agreed to arbitrate in France. In
September 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled that it was
proper to require personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant or its property
as a prerequisite to enforcement of an arbitral award.55
Other countries also appear to require a connection between the award
debtor or his property and the place of enforcement in order to bring an action
to confirm or enforce an award.56 However, it has been pointed out by
Professor Rusty Park that general principles of judicial jurisdiction do not
necessarily control in situations governed by an international treaty, and the
formal statutory requirements in other countries may not tell the whole story. 7
Thus, in order to ascertain actual practice in other countries, it may be
necessary to probe further than the information provided by the N.Y. City Bar
Committee Report.
Case law in the United States has added even more complexity to the
jurisdictional question. At least one case, Base Metal Trading,Ltd. v. OJSC,
in the Fourth Circuit, indicated that the presence and/or attachment of property
in the state was not, on its own, a sufficient basis for enforcement of an arbitral
award.58 The N.Y. City Bar Committee criticized Base Metal Trading as
54

181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

5' Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. Azer., 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009); see also
Telcordia Tech, Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2006) (assuming
without discussion that personal jurisdiction was necessary for suit to enforce a New York
Convention award rendered in South Africa and suggesting that its finding of sufficient contacts
was colored by the fact that the proceeding was for the enforcement of an award rather than a
merits adjudication); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Hamarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1120-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that either personal jurisdiction over the
defendant or its property would satisfy due process); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC, 283
F.3d 208, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2002) (indicating that the presence of attachment of property in a
state is not sufficient for enforcement of an arbitral award).
In Frontera,the Second Circuit introduced another puzzling issue by holding that foreign
states and their agents are not entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause and overruled
its prior decision in Texas Trading &Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). The
Second Circuit then remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the defendant
was in fact an "agent" of the sovereign.
56 N.Y. City Bar Committee Report, supranote 51, at 413-14 (identifying China, Japan, and
Switzerland as having such requirements). As one example, it states that the Japanese
Arbitration Law provides for jurisdiction of enforcement actions in the district court at the place
of arbitration, the general forum of the counterparty, the location of the object of the claim, or
the location of the debtor's seizable assets. Id. at 413 n.24.
5 See Park & Yanos, supra note 53, at 267.
58 Base Metal Trading, 283 F.3d at 213.
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completely misreading Supreme Court precedent and pointed to a Ninth Circuit
case, Glencore Grain Rotterdam B. V.v. Shivnath Rai HarnarainCo., which
observed that either personal jurisdiction over the defendant or its property
would satisfy the requirements of Due Process.59 The N.Y. City Bar
Committee also embraced the view that the requirement ofpersonal jurisdiction
to enforce an arbitral award is mandated by the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and thus, even without such a ground being identified in the New
York Convention, lack of jurisdiction provides a valid basis for refusal of
recognition or enforcement of a Convention award.6" In Glencore Grain itself,
the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the activities of the defendant in the
forum did not suffice for either general or specific jurisdiction, and it could not
identify any property of the defendant on which to base jurisdiction." One
troubling aspect of the court's opinion, however, was its invocation of the
possibility that "unreasonableness" might prevent the assertion of jurisdiction
even if sufficient contacts were found. The court suggested that because India
or England was a more appropriate forum with respect to a suit to confirm an
arbitration award, jurisdiction could therefore be "unreasonable. 62 Such a
view is inconsistent with the objectives of the New York Convention and the
important principle that the purpose of the Convention was to make arbitral
awards enforceable worldwide. Still, other cases-one in the Second Circuit,
Monegasque de ReassurancesS.A.M v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 63 have ignored
this fundamental aspect of the Convention by invoking the doctrine offorum
non conveniens to dismiss an action requesting confirmation of an arbitration
award. The Second Circuit held that Article III of the New York Convention
accommodated the application offorum non conveniens because the doctrine
was "procedural" and has been applied in the United States in the enforcement
of domestic arbitral awards.'
The use offorum non conveniens to limit confirmation or enforcement of
Convention awards threatens the international currency of the awards the
Convention was designed to enhance. In its opinion, the Second Circuit
expressed concern about chilling international trade and even discouraging

19Glencore Grain,284 F.3d at 1120-22.
6' N.Y. City Bar Committee Report, supra note 51, at 408-09.
61 Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1123-28.
It should be noted that the Second Circuit
in Frontera held that foreign states are not "persons" entitled to rights under the Due
Process Clause. Frontera,582 F.3d at 400; see also Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
62 Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1125-26.
63 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002).
64Id.at 495-98.
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arbitration when suits to confirm were brought in places without any
connection to the parties or the transaction. To that end, the court was reluctant
to allow a party complete freedom in deciding where to enforce an award.65
The point takes on additional poignancy when combined with the forum
shopping that may occur with respect to uncertainty about enforcement of
awards that have been set aside. But it is difficult to imagine that worldwide
enforcement would really have such a deleterious effect; indeed, worldwide
enforcement was the very objective of the Convention. If awards could be
enforced only in "convenient" fora, parties expecting to lose an arbitration
would be encouraged to identify countries with no contacts with the judgment
or the underlying transaction in which to keep their assets in order to avoid
execution of the award.66 In the particular circumstances of Monegasque,
however, the claimant attempted to confirm the award not only against the
award debtor, a Ukrainian company, but also against the Ukraine, which was
not a party to the underlying agreement or proceeding, on the theory that the
company had acted as the alter ego of the Ukraine itself.67 In this context,
application offorum non conveniens seems appropriate, and the N.Y. City Bar
Committee agreed that 'forum non conveniens should be available as a defense
to enforcement of an arbitral award against68a defendant who was not a party to
the proceeding that resulted in the award.,
IV. NULL AND VoID AGREEMENTS-WHOSE LAW?

Another set of Convention issues that has led to significant litigation
activity involves situations where a party challenges the validity of the
arbitration agreement. Article 11(1) provides that each Contracting State shall
recognize an arbitration agreement in writing so long as it concerns a "subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration., 69 Article 11(3) of the Convention
65

Id. at 497.

66 This concern was expressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

in TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303-04 (D.C. Cir. 2(05).
67 Id. at 301.
68 N.Y. City Bar Committee Report, supra note 51, at 43; see also Park & Yanos, supra
note 53, at 293-94 (stating that Monegasque "may well have been correctly decided on the
narrow facts of the case").
69 New York Convention, supranote 1, art. II(1). In this Article, I do not address the choice
of law aspects of non-arbitrability under Article 11(1) of the Convention. However, there is
thorough and insightful treatment of the subject in 1 BORN, supranote 22, at 516-35. For a recent
article on the choice of law aspects of arbitrability, see Stavros L. Brekoulakis, Law Applicable to
Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex Fori, in ARBrrRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTrIVES 99 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
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requires a Contracting State, at the request of one of the parties, to refer the
parties to arbitration "unless it finds that the... agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed."7 Article II says nothing about
what law determines whether an agreement meets those conditions. Moreover,
the generally accepted concept of separability would indicate that the reference
to the "agreement" in this context is a reference to the validity of the arbitration
agreement itself and not the main contract. And in most cases, there will be no
express choice of law clause designated to cover the arbitrationagreement,7'
even if there is a general choice of law clause with respect to the contract itself.
Article V, in the context of recognition and enforcement, does identify the
relevant law on particular matters. Thus, Article V(1)(a) provides that
recognition and enforcement may be refused if, "under the law applicableto
them," the parties were under some incapacity; or "the agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the awardwas made., 72 Article
V(1)(d) contains an exception to recognition and enforcement if the
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure is not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, if there is no agreement, is
"not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place. 7 3 Article V(2)(a) provides for an exception to recognition and
enforcement if "[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country."74 Article V(2)(b) has
an exception where the award is contrary to the public policy of the state
"where enforcement or recognition is sought."75
As noted, there is no direct choice of law reference with respect to
agreements under Article II of the New York Convention. Some aspects of the
Article 11(3) defenses have appropriately been interpreted according to an
international standard, such as whether a clause is sufficiently pathological that
it is either "null and void" or "incapable of being performed"; but other aspects

70 New York
71Of course,

Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(3).
if there is such an express choice of law clause applicable to the arbitration
agreement, the principle of party autonomy would ensure that such law would govern. The
application of the parties' express choice is also consistent with the choice of law reference in
Article V(1)(a) dealing with the validity of the agreement in an enforcement context.
72 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a) (emphasis added).
7 Id. art. V(1)(d) (emphasis added).
71Id. art. V(2)(a) (emphasis added).
" Id.art. V(2)(b) (emphasis added).
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are less clear. If the question is one of mistake, duress, or waiver with respect
to the arbitration agreement, what law should govern that question?76
Courts in the United States have tended to apply forum law in determining
the validity of the arbitration agreement in cases subject to the Convention.77
In Rhone Mgditerran& Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazioniv. Achille Lauro, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
alluded to the ambiguity in Article II as compared with Article V. 78 It then
concluded that the interpretation of Article 11(3) most consistent with the
overall purposes of the Convention finds that "an agreement to arbitrate is 'null
and void' only (1) when it is subject to an internationally recognized defense
such as duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver .. .or (2) when it contravenes
fundamental policies of the forum state., 79 The court rejected application of
the law of the place of arbitration (Italy) which required that there be an odd
number of arbitrators and instead used what might be characterized as an
international standard, subject to fundamental policies of forum law (U.S. law)
to uphold the agreement."0 The deviation between that choice of law reference
and the express choice of law reference found in Articles V(1)(a) and (d) may
result in an arbitration agreement that will be respected by a court even though
the subsequent award may not eventually be enforced. Another disadvantage
with the application of forum law is that it might also lead to litigation
maneuvering by the respective parties in order to secure a choice of law
advantage on the issue of validity.
Courts in other countries have looked to the law of the place of arbitration
to determine whether the arbitration agreement is null and void.8 ' This choice
76 For recent commentary regarding the law applicable to determine whether a clause is "null

and void," see Piero Bemardini, The ProblemofArbitrability in General,in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS:

THE NEW YORK

CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, supranote 7, at 503; R. Doak Bishop, Wade M. Coriell & Macelo
Medino Campos, The 'Nulland Void'Provisionofthe New York Convention, in ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBTRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, supranote 7, at 275, 294.
77 See 1 BORN, supra note 22, at 461-62.
78 Rhone Mditerrane Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni v. Achille

Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983).
79 Id.
at 53 (citations omitted).
80 Id.at 52-55; seealso Ferrara S.p.A. v. United Grain Growers Ltd., 441 F. Supp. 778,780-81
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (suggesting that forum law should apply as part of the law of remedies), aff'd
without reportedopinion, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
81 See, e.g., Sonatrach Petroleum Corp. (BVI) v. Ferrell Int'l Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R.
(Comm.) 627 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (concluding that inthe absence of express choice of law clause and
where venue of arbitration is identified, the arbitration agreement, and substantive contract, are
governed by the law of the place of arbitration); XL Ins. Ltd. v. Owens Coming, [2000] 2 Lloyd's
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of law rule has the advantage of meshing the choice of law reference in
Article 11(3) with that of Article V(1)(a), thereby avoiding the difficulty that an
agreement considered valid at the outset might result in the award being set
aside because the agreement did not meet the requirements of the law chosen
or the law of the place of arbitration. 82 Moreover, although the New York
Convention is not directed to arbitral tribunals, arbitrators have taken a similar
approach when faced with a challenge to the arbitration agreement. In Seller
(Korea)v. Buyer (Jordan),the arbitrators, finding support from their obligation
to render an enforceable award and pointing to Article V(1)(a), determined that
the applicable law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement was that
where the arbitration took place and where the award was rendered.83 Note,
however, that the arbitral situs is often chosen for reasons of convenience and
the law at the arbitral situs may have little connection to the parties and the
underlying transaction.
Still other courts have subjected the question of the validity of the
arbitration agreement to the law applicable to the contract,whether through an
express choice of law clause governing the contract," or in the absence of an
express clause, the choice of law rules that would apply to the contract." But

Rep. 500 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (stating that the selection of arbitration in England reflects parties'
implied choice of English law to govern the validity of arbitration clause); American Bureau of
Shipping v. Copropridt6 Maritime Jules Verne, Cour d'Appel [CA] Paris, Dec. 4, 2002, note
Gaillard (Fr.), reprintedin 2003 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 1286 (2003) (analogizing to the conflict
rules provided in Article V(1)(a)); Corte app., Genoa, Feb. 3, 1990, Della Sanara KustvaartBevrachting & OverslagbedrijfBV v. Fallimento Cap. Giovanni Coppola Srl, reprintedin 17 Y.B.
Com. Arb. 542, 543 (1992) (pointing to choice of law rule in recognition/enforcement context as
a basis for evaluating an arbitration agreement when it is invoked to derogate from the jurisdiction
of the national court).
82 JULIAN D.M. LEw, LOuKAS A. MisTELIs & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6-55, at 119 (2003).
83 Case No. 6149 (Korea v. Jordan), 20 Y.B. Com. Arb. 41 (Interim Award) (I.C.C. 1990).
4 See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39,50-51 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
where parties choose Swiss law to apply to the contract, Swiss law also determines the validity
of the arbitration agreement); Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC
(Comm) 121 Lloyd's Rep. 603 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (stating that, on application for set aside of an
English arbitral award, the tribunal should have determined the validity of the arbitration
agreement according to parties' express choice of substantive law applicable to the main
contract); see also Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48
(Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (stating that an express choice of law clause may be understood to govern the
commercial bargain as well as the agreement to arbitrate).
85 See cases cited in 1 BORN, supra note 22, at 475-76 n.313 (listing several cases in which
courts applied the substantive law governing a contract, era in the absence of an express choiceof-law clause). In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 218 refers
to the validity and effect of arbitration agreements to the law selected by § 187 or § 188 of the
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this approach is in some tension with the separability doctrine, 86 and the choice
of law rules that would apply to the contract in the absence of an express
choice are often unclear and do not offer any degree of predictability. For that
reason, some have suggested an alternative reference that selects the law of a
jurisdiction connected to the transaction, the parties, and the arbitration that
validates the agreement.8 7 Such an approach has been adopted in legislation in
some countries, for example, in the Swiss private international law statute. 8
Indeed, it has been argued that a validation principle would be consistent with
Article V(l)(a) of the New York Convention because the reference to the "law
to which the parties have subjected" the arbitration agreement could
accommodate an implied choice of law rule.89 Moreover, the discretionary
language in Article V(1)(a) allows courts to refuse to recognize an award but
does not require non-recognition. Thus, national courts should be permitted to
recognize arbitral awards where the underlying agreement is not valid under the
choice of law referenced in Article V(1)(a) but is valid under a choice of law
principle that selects the law that validates the agreement. 90
In the future, we may find even more attention directed to the conflict of
laws issue on the validity of the arbitration agreement in light of provisions
included in the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(Choice of Court Convention).9' That Convention-which aspires to be the
Restatement (the law chosen by the parties or the law that has the "most significant relationship
to the transaction and the parties" under the principles stated in § 6). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFCONFLICTOFLAws § 218 & cmt. b (1971). Comment b to § 218 notes that the state whose
local law governs the arbitration agreement will usually be the state whose local law is applied
to other issues relating to the contract, but acknowledges that this will not always be so. Indeed,
Comment b offers as one such example that where arbitration is to take place in a particular
state, the law of that state may have the "most significant relationship" to the issue of the
arbitration agreement. Id. § 218 cmt. b. It should be pointed out, however, that § 218 is a
general provision applicable to both domestic and international agreements, and neither the
Comments nor Reporter's Notes consider the effect of the New York Convention and the choice
of law reference in Article V(1)(a) of the Convention.
86 However, the English court in Peterson Farms,Inc. v. C & M Farming,Ltd., [2004]
EWHC (Comm) 121 Lloyd's Rep. 603 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.), emphasized that the "autonomy" of the
arbitration agreement was not the relevant concern in the choice of law context, and that the
appropriate law was the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract as a whole.
87 See 1 BORN, supra note 22, at 497-504 (endorsing a validation principle).
" See Bundesgesetz uber das Internationale Privatrecht [Federal Code of Private
International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 178 (Switz.). An unofficial English translation
of the text of the Swiss statute can be found at http://www.umbricht.ch/pdf/SwissPIL.pdf.
89 1 BORN, supra note 22, at 501.
9 Id.
9' Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294.
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New York Convention analogue for courts-contains a provision requiring
courts to respect a choice of court agreement unless the agreement is "null and
void. 92 Thus, Article 5 of the Choice of Court Convention requires courts of
a Contracting State to that Convention to decide a dispute, "unless the
agreement is null and void under the law of that State."'93 Unlike the New York
Convention, there is an express choice of law reference to the law of the forum
state, and that "law" includes the conflict of laws rules of the forum state.94
Thus, the chosen court's choice of law rules will be invoked to determine the
validity of the choice of court clause. To ensure conformity and avoid some
of the difficulties of the New York Convention with respect to enforcement of
agreements and recognition of awards, the Choice of Court Convention uses
the same reference with respect to when a state must dismiss in favor of the
chosen forum, i.e., unless "the agreement is null and void under the law of the
'
State of the chosen court."95
This includes the choice of law rules. The Choice
of Court Convention contains the same reference again on recognition and
enforcement of ajudgment where jurisdiction was based on the choice of court
clause, i.e., that the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of
the chosen court,96 including its conflict of laws rules. Thus, the choice of law
rules at the chosen forum will determine the applicable law governing the
validity of the clause itself.
This is not to suggest that a similar solution would work for agreements
under the New York Convention. The arbitral situs has much greater
"anationality" than a chosen court, and reference to the conflict of laws rules
of the arbitral situs would not necessarily be in keeping with the parties'
intention. But the formal framework developed for the issue of validity of the
forum selection clause in the Choice of Court Convention and the objective of
harmonizing the prejudgment and postjudgment contexts for assessing validity
suggests that another look should be taken at these issues in the arbitration
context, whether by developing an international approach to the choice of law
issue, or by a formal amendment to the New York Convention.

92Id.art. 5(1).
93Id.
9'That

in

the reference to "law" in Article 5(1) includes the choice of law rules is made clear

TREVOR HARTLEY

&

MASATO DOGAUCHI, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION

OF 30 JUNE 2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 125 (2007) (Permanent Bureau of the
Conference ed., 2007), reprintedin RONALD A. BRAND & PAuL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE
CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COuRT AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND DOcuMENTs 236
(2008). For more on the background of this provision, see BRAND & HERRUP, supra, at 79-82.

" Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 91, art. 6(a).
96 Id. art. 9(a).
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V. CONCLUSION

At the same time I offer these reflections on aspects of the New York
Convention where the role for national law has created uncertainty and
confusion, I recognize how important the Convention has been in creating a
vibrant climate in which international arbitration has flourished. But after fifty
years, it might be time to do some fine-tuning to a few limited provisions, and
it is with that possibility in mind that I have offered these comments.

